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Soviet Union Eastern Europe

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

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Soviet-Turkish Relations

Moscow is continuing its low-key efforts to exploit US-Turkish tensions. It may be encouraged by some recent Turkish gestures.

The Soviets evidently have renewed an invitation to the deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff to visit Moscow. Prime Minister Demirel vetoed an earlier trip, but the Turkish General Staff seems confident Demirel will now let the visit take place sometime in the next three months. One reason for the turnaround apparently is the interest of Demirel and the Turkish military in pursuing Moscow's hints that it is willing to make arms sales to Turkey.

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The Soviets have been careful to avoid overplaying their hand in Turkey since the US arms embargo was imposed early this year. They recognize that long-standing Turkish suspicions rule out any dramatic turnaround in Ankara's position vis-a-vis the USSR and that the Turks will not replace large amounts of US hardware with Soviet equipment. Moscow's discreet overtures, therefore, seem designed only to reassure the Turks that they have little to fear from the USSR and to suggest that military ties with the US--including US bases in Turkey--are not as essential to Turkish security as Ankara once thought. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)

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Romania-USSR: Less Warm and Not So Comradely

The strains between Bucharest and Moscow were clearly reflected in President Ceausescu's congratulatory cable to the Soviet leadership on the October Revolution anniversary.

Although the protocol aspects of Romania's observance of the anniversary--the speeches and receptions--were on a par with those of last year, the telegram was noticeably cooler. In addition to omitting the key phrase "fraternal greetings," it downgraded the 1974 formulation of "traditional relations of fraternal friendship" to a simple "friendly relations." The message also failed to make the usual reference to the Soviet Union as the "first state of workers and peasants," and--in a move undoubtedly calculated to annoy the Kremlin--it placed Romania and the Soviet Union on a equal footing in their ability to make constructive contributions to solving contemporary problems and furthering detente.

Meanwhile, more trouble may be brewing. Recent reports say that Romanian Defense Minister Ionita has just canceled a trip to the Soviet Union. In addition, Bucharest and Moscow have apparently made little progress in agreeing on a five year economic cooperation agreement, and the Romanians have indicated that they intend to fight hard against Soviet initiatives on economic integration at the coming CEMA summit. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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
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Moscow Severs Relations with Uganda

Moscow's decision to sever relations with Kampala "temporarily" is an obvious Soviet effort to beat Ugandan President Amin to the diplomatic punch.

The mercurial Amin had threatened to break relations with the USSR unless a "high-powered emissary" from General Secretary Brezhnev arrived in Kampala this morning with a satisfactory explanation for the pressure the Soviets have put on Uganda to support the Popular Movement in Angola. Amin had also demanded the withdrawal of Moscow's ambassador--whom he labeled a "criminal"--from Kampala.

By referring to the temporary nature of the diplomatic break, the Soviets have left the door open for a resumption of relations. The initiative, however, will almost certainly have to come from Amin.
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CEMA Summit Next Week

The CEMA summit of party and government leaders apparently will be held in Moscow during the week of November 17-21.

According to a Soviet CEMA specialist, the four major economic themes of the meeting will be raw materials, machine building, agricultural development and cooperation, and transport. In addition, some administrative changes may be made, especially in the role and responsibilities of the CEMA secretariat, and the West European Common Market.

The Soviet specialist believes that the CEMA-EC question is not a major issue and that the Romanians are "under control." Furthermore, he says that the East Germans and Czechoslovaks have been strongly critical of Bucharest's insistence that each CEMA country determine its own relationship with the EC and not cede this responsibility to the CEMA secretariat. For their part, Romanian diplomats assert that the Soviets have "persistently refused" to make a "reasonable compromise" despite several high-level Romanian missions to Moscow over the past month. Bucharest believes that on this issue it has at least the tacit support of the Poles and Hungarians.

Although Romanian recalcitrance will spoil the atmosphere surrounding the ceremonial unveiling of Moscow's plans for CEMA integration over the next five years, it probably will not prevent the Soviets from going ahead with the event. Most of the major CEMA policy lines have presumably already been agreed on and merely await top-level government and party approval at the Moscow summit. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Yugoslav Vigilance Campaign

3 Belgrade's campaign against pro-Soviet subversives and other deviationists is now entering its fourth week with no signs of abating.

2 Tito himself added new impetus to the drive over the weekend. During a visit to the Vojvodina--a conservative stronghold--Tito urged local Communists to "clear the ranks" of all who pose an obstacle to socialism. On Friday, he put the provincial leaders through a tough grilling on the results of their political and economic stewardship. He may not have been satisfied with their answers; the next day he implied that local Communists are too soft on advocates of Stalinist programs.

A Montengrin plenum last week heard the republic party leader, Veselin Djuranovic, confess to similar laxity in his organization. Djuranovic admitted that, in its zeal to crush liberals over the past few years, the republic regime had left the door open to pro-Soviets. He claimed that the party leadership remains--and thus presumably undeserving of a major shakeup--but he ordered an attack on factionalism throughout the ranks.

In the meantime, the propaganda mill in Belgrade continues to grind out tantalizing rumors and tidbits of information calculated to hold the attention of the domestic and foreign press. Leaks this week from high-level officials are--as in the past--cautiously skirting the issue of direct Soviet involvement with the pro-Stalinists.

A Foreign Ministry official, however, told the US embassy that Brezhnev's denials of Soviet support for the Stalinists--given personally to Tito in Helsinki last August--were, at best, only partially credible. The official then qualified his remarks by saying that the US should not make too much of

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the Soviet connection, implying that if Washington did, Belgrade might be forced, as a counterweight, to condemn anti-Titoist emigre activities in the US.

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Despite the effort to keep the lid on speculation about Soviet motives, some influential forces apparently would have it otherwise. The military journal *Narodna Armijaa* last week, for example, dredged up Yugoslavia's past reaction to threats like the Cyprus crisis and the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The revival of the invasion issue is out of step with the policy of restraint and might be the military's way of sharpening the anti-Soviet edge of the campaign. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Eastern Europe: Struggling
To Preserve the Gains

8 In the aftermath of the Helsinki summit, several East European regimes have stepped up their efforts to protect, and if possible to expand, whatever autonomy they now enjoy. Their recent actions suggest that they anticipate renewed Soviet attempts to undercut their freedom of maneuver.

1 8) Indeed, the East Europeans may well have had a common perception that the Kremlin intended to use the results of Helsinki to reassert Soviet hegemony not only in Eastern Europe but throughout the world Communist movement. Certainly they recognized in the security talks the implicit endorsement of Moscow's continued domination of the "buffer zone" it conquered in World War II. Furthermore, they saw in Soviet pressures for a conference of European Communist parties (ECPC) and for closer economic integration in CEMA the intent to tie them more closely to the Kremlin's apron strings.

1 8) Moscow originally wanted to hold the ECPC immediately after the security talks, presumably in order to hand down at once an authoritative interpretation of the document signed in Helsinki. A timely ECPC could thus have "clarified" such ideologically delicate concepts as sovereignty, independence, and the renunciation of force as they applied to relations among Communist countries. It could also have reasserted the leading role of the Soviet party.

1 8) These plans, however, ran afoul of opposition from the Yugoslav, Romanian, Italian, and Spanish parties. With the desired linkage thus thwarted, the East Europeans were prone to see the publication of Konstantin Zarodov's attack on the soft-line tactics of Western Communist parties (*Pravda*, August 6) as another attempt to assert the Soviet party's

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continuing hegemony, and their suspicions were reinforced when Brezhnev held a highly unusual and widely publicized meeting with Zorodov in mid-September. Even more alarming was the signing on October 7 of a revised Soviet - East German friendship treaty that contains the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" of limited sovereignty.

Romania

In the wake of these developments, and perhaps in response to increased Kremlin pressure against his independent policies, Romania's Ceausescu went on something of an anti-Soviet warpath.

During his visit to Portugal in late October,

- 1 2
1 --He publicly advised the cooperation of all political parties, including elements of the bourgeoisie, in solving Portugal's problems.
- In private, he bluntly warned members of the Revolutionary Council to stick with the West and with America and to avoid falling into Soviet clutches.
- He advised Lisbon to give power in Angola to whichever faction is on top on November 11, thus avoiding a repetition of Moscow's specific endorsement of the MPLA.

1 Back home last week, he charged Romanian youth to conduct an unrelenting struggle to ensure that Romania joins the ranks of the free nations so that the country would "remain unchained forever."

At the same time, one of his top emissaries was in Washington, telling US officials that Bucharest was opposing Soviet initiatives at the coming CEMA summit that would further limit Romanian freedom of maneuver in economic relations.

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8 These are Ceausescu's most strident anti-Soviet utterances in years, and they cannot fail to raise the Kremlin's hackles. Indeed, at first blush, they appear to be the behavior of a man who is so fed up with Soviet pressure that he is willing to take serious political risks.

8 At the same time, his uncanny ability to judge the limits of Soviet tolerance--combined with his perception of the situation in the Kremlin--suggests that he is confident that he can get away with his campaign.

Yugoslavia

5 8 The same fundamental preoccupation with sovereignty is evident in Yugoslav actions. Belgrade's stonewalling at the preparatory sessions for the ECPC does more than highlight Tito's stubborn refusal to accept any form of Soviet hegemony over Yugoslavia. It is also designed to thwart the expansion of the Soviet party's influence beyond the confines of the Warsaw Pact.

4 8 At home, the increasingly bitter campaign against Cominformists seeks not only to shatter real or imagined factions that might try to return the country to the Soviet fold after Tito's passing, it also serves to warn the nation as a whole to beware of falling into the trap.

Poland

167 Polish party boss Gierek took advantage of the Helsinki summit to achieve an important agreement with West Germany, and immediately thereafter reportedly had to fend off strong criticism from Soviet Premier Kosygin on the Westward drift of Poland's economic policies. Since then, he has nevertheless installed a leading "Americanizer" as chief of the State Planning Commission, and continues to move rapidly ahead with his attempts to conclude major contracts with several US firms.

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8 Meantime, he is grappling with the economically necessary but politically dangerous problem of increasing the prices on basic food items. He is painfully aware that this action, combined with chronic food shortages, could trigger domestic discord of the kind that would focus highly unwelcome Soviet attention on the Polish scene.

Albania

5 Even the isolated, xenophobic Albanians are showing signs of unease. Recent reporting suggests a growing belief in Tirana that Moscow might try to bring the country back into the Soviet alliance system.

Why take the risks?

8 All the East Europeans, and particularly the Romanians, are fully aware of the risks involved in seeking to thwart Moscow's hegemonist impulses. The more independent among them may believe, however, that because of the current circumstances in Moscow the potential benefits outweigh the risks.

--They evidently consider that Moscow has now missed its best opportunity to impose its interpretation of the Helsinki declaration.

--They have apparently decided that the current Soviet leadership wants the ECPC much more than they do.

--They may also believe that Soviet attention to Eastern Europe will decrease as Moscow becomes increasingly preoccupied with preparations for the next Soviet party congress.

The most important single factor in the calculations of the East European leaders, however, seems to

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8 be their perception of the situation within the Soviet leadership itself. The East Europeans are hard-headed political realists who have very close contact with the Kremlin, and are keenly aware of Soviet power. They are not likely to take unnecessary chances. Yet their actions contain an element of haste that suggests a need to shore up their positions and to carve out additional gains while there is still time. They may simply perceive a sense of drift in the Soviet leadership that can be exploited to advantage, but there have been some reports that they expect a major shift in Soviet policy or within the Kremlin. In any event, the more independent-minded East Europeans, believe that a tougher line against them is very much within the realm of possible. They will therefore continue--at least until the Soviet party congress--to attempt to make hay while the sun shines. (SECRET NOFORN/ORCON)

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